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1. Introduction
Pharmaceuticals and other organic wastewater contaminants are found in treated
wastewater in Europe (Ternes, 1998; Comoretto and Chiron, 2005), the US, (Boyd et
al., 2003) and Asia (Nozaki et al., 2000). These observations suggest that wastewater
treatment plants do not totally abate pollution; they are only partially e¢ cient. More-
over, their production process may also be polluting. According to Kyung et al. (2013),
wastewater treatment plants (and incineration facilities) have been reported to emit sig-
nicant amounts of GHGs, and water treatment plants have also been categorized as
one of the signicant public facilities emitting important amounts of CO2 by consuming
immense amounts of electricity and chemicals (Raucher et al., 2008; Rothausen and Con-
way, 2011). Along the same lines, a debate has emerged about the energy balance of the
photovoltaic industry. This raises the question of grey energy. Grey energy is the hidden
energy associated with a product, meaning the total energy consumed throughout the
product life cycle from its production to its disposal. The issue is whether the reduction
in pollution is greater than the grey energy consumed. If this is the case, we can infer
that the eco-industry is e¢ cient.
Wastewater treatment, air treatment, waste treatment plants and the photovoltaic
industry are all part of the eco-industry sector. This is a new industrial sector covering
pollution and resource management activities, ranging from the development of clean
technologies to the optimization of methods for monitoring and managing environmental
impacts.4 It appears that this sector can be partially e¢ cient and polluting. This point is
crucial for policy-makers because the emergence of eco-industry rms is often conditional
on environmental policy.
The eco-industry is well-documented in the economic literature, but nevertheless
mainly focuses on the fact that it is highly concentrated. The research can be divided
in two main branches. The rst branch considers innovative rms investing in R&D to
obtain a patent for a pollution-reducing new technology. The performance of taxes and
tradable permits are compared in various contexts. Denicolo (1999) and Requate (2005)
make these comparisons under di¤erent timing and commitment regimes. A threat of
imitation is introduced by Fisher et al. (2003), while Perino (2008) studies green horizon-
tal innovation, where new technologies reduce pollution of one type while causing a new
type of damage. More recently, Perino (2010a) focuses on the second-best policies for all
combinations of emission intensity and marginal abatement costs.
The second branch analyses how eco-industry modies the usual results of the eco-
nomic literature. It takes market power as a given and suggests the optimal design of
environmental policy within this context. Most of these papers consider the Pigouvian tax
as environmental policy tool: see for instance Canton (2008), Canton et al. (2007), Can-
ton et al. 2012, David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005, 2010), David et al. (2011), Nimubona
4See Ernst and Young (2006), Sinclair-Desgagné (2008), European Commission Report (1999, 2007,
2009) and OECD (1999) for an analysis and description of eco-industry.
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(2012) and Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005, 2010). Greaker (2006) and Greaker
and Rosendahl (2008) introduce non-tradable quotas, while Schwartz and Stahn (2014)
study a pollution permit market
None of the studies mentioned above explores polluting eco-industry. The aim of this
paper is to investigate whether the standard results in economic literature are challenged
if the eco-industry is polluting. Following almost all the papers cited, we consider a ver-
tical structure composed of a downstream polluting sector and an upstream eco-industry.
Contrary to the existing literature, in this article eco-industry rms are polluting and
heterogeneous, i.e., they are more or less polluting. This situation may correspond to
di¤erent generations of plants having di¤erent technologies. We also assume that they
cannot reduce their emissions. To focus on this original assumption, we do not con-
sider market power. Under these new assumptions, we rst seek to dene the centralized
solution. Next, we examine whether this optimal policy can be decentralized using a
traditional economic instrument: the Pigouvian tax. On these points, our article is in
keeping with the second branch of the economic literature described above.
We nd that two kinds of equilibrium can emerge. The rst equilibrium occurs if
the marginal damage is not too high. In this case, we extend the usual results of the
economic literature to polluting eco-industry. We nd that the optimal level of abatement
is such that the marginal social benet and marginal social cost of abatement are equal
to the marginal damage. The dirty rm partially abates its emissions and only e¢ cient
eco-industry rms produce. The greater the marginal damage, the less the dirty rm
produces and the higher the abatement level.
The second kind of equilibrium occurs if the marginal damage is high: the dirty
rm abates all its emissions and not all active rms in the rst equilibrium produce.
As pollution is very harmful for the environment, the only way to prevent even more
damage is to reduce the pollution produced by eco-industry. To do this in an e¢ cient
way, the regulator should not only reduce the number of active rms but also modify the
distribution of abatement in the eco-industry. We also nd the counter-intuitive result
that the number of active rms and the level of abatement decrease with the marginal
damage. The optimal abatement level is such that the marginal social benet is equal to
the marginal social cost, but they are both lower than the marginal damage. This second
equilibrium is very specic to polluting eco-industry.
Finally, we show that a competitive economy reaches these optimal equilibria if the
regulator implements a Pigouvian tax. The rule is very simple, because it is the same
whatever the level of the damage: the Pigouvian tax must be equal to the marginal
damage. However, depending on the damage level, the functioning of the economy will
be di¤erent, as we will see in the paper.
In Section 2, we present the model. Section 3 denes the social benets and social
costs of pollution abatement. In Section 4 we determine the e¢ cient level of abatement.
Policy issues are presented in Section 5 and some concluding remarks are given in Section
6. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix
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2. The basic assumptions
To keep the assumptions as simple as possible, we assume that the standard polluting
industry is characterized by a representative rm that produces a quantity Q at a given
cost C(Q). This cost is increasing and convex (i.e., C 0(Q) > 0 and C 00(Q) > 0) and inac-
tion is allowed (i.e., C(0) = 0). This activity is polluting. Emissions are given by "(Q), an
increasing and convex function (i.e., "0(Q) > 0 and "00(q) > 0) with "(0) = 0. This "end-
of-pipe" pollution can be reduced by an abatement activity provided by the specialized
external rms which comprise the eco-industry. So if we denote by A the total abatement
realized by the polluting rm, the remaining pollution will be max f"(Q)  A; 0g.
The eco-industry is composed of a continuum5 [0; 1] of rms indexed by i. Each
of them supplies a(i) pollution reduction services produced at some cost  (a(i)). They
share the same increasing and convex cost function and inaction is allowed (i.e., 0(a) > 0,
00(a) > 0 and (0) = 0) We also assume that 0(0) = 0 in order to ensure that there is,
in a competitive setting, an o¤er for each positive price6.
owever, we assume that this activity pollutes and that these rms are heterogeneous
with respect to their emissions. Emissions of rm i are a proportion (i) 2 [min; max] of
its production and are considered as unavoidable (they cannot be abated). Since one unit
of abatement good reduces the pollution of the downstream rm in the same proportion,
the coe¢ cient [1   (i)] measures the net contribution of rm i to pollution reduction.
Firms in the abatement good sector are also heterogenous: they are ranked from the least
to the most polluting. We also assume that  : [0; 1] ! [min; max] is a continuous and
di¤erentiable function, and because they are ranked, 0(i) > 0.
Finally we assume min < 1 to ensure that at least some rms have a net contribution
to global pollution reduction. max > 1 means that at least some of these rms contribute
to pollution abatement in an ine¢ cient way since their global contribution to the emissions
reduction per unit of output, (1  (i)), is negative.
The global emissions, E = max f"(Q)  A; 0g + R 1
0
(i)a(i)di, are comprised of the
remaining pollution from the dirty industry and the emissions generated by the abatement
activity. This means that we can have situations in which the dirty industry is clean
and some pollution remains. So, contrary to most of the literature which does not consider
polluting eco-industry, it is now crucial to take into account the fact that the abatement
activity becomes ine¢ cient when the pollution of the dirty industry is completely removed.
We assume that these emissions create social damage, measured by D(E) = v:E with
v > 0. Hence v is the marginal damage.
Finally, to close the model, we introduce an inverse demand function for the polluting
5This continuum assumption is essentially introduced to simplify the treatment of an industry com-
posed of heterogeneous agents. The same arguments hold with a nite number of rms.
6A discussion about the emergence of an eco-industry related to the fact that 0(0) > 0 can be found
in Canton et al. (2007).
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goods P (Q). This function is decreasing (i.e. P 0(Q) < 0) and veries that limQ!0 P (Q) =
+1 and limQ!+1 P (Q) = 0.
3. Social benets and costs from pollution abatement
This section is rather traditional. We x a production level A of the abatement good
and dene, within our setting, the social benets and costs of this abatement choice. The
main di¤erence with the usual approach is that the eco-industry is polluting. This has
two consequences: (i) these goods only reduce the emissions of the polluting industry and
(ii) the residual pollution must be included in the social cost of the abatement production.
We then obtain the marginal social benet and marginal social cost of abatement.
The social benet of abatement The social benet from a level A of pollution
abatement is obtained by choosing the production of the dirty industry. This production
level maximizes the welfare of consumers net of the production costs and of the pollution
induced by this activity. This function is given by:
SB(A; v) = max
Q0
Z Q
0
P (q)dq

  C(Q)  v max f"(Q)  A; 0g (1)
This denition of the social benet is very conventional, especially for "end-of-pipe" pol-
lution. But in most treatments of this problem, the condition stating that the emission of
the dirty industry must be non-negative (i.e., max f"(Q)  A; 0g in our article) is quickly
forgotten simply because this corner solution in which no pollution occurs is not really
interesting. However, this is far from being the case when the eco-industry also pollutes,
because there is now a possible arbitrage between upstream and downstream pollution,
i.e., between the emissions of the abaters and those of the nal goods producers. This
is why we have to solve this non-smooth optimization problem globally. The method
(see the proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix) essentially makes use of the sub-di¤erential
introduced by Rockafellar (1979). In any event, non-smooth optimization involves case
studies and thresholds. In this article, if we solve this program for all levels of pollution
abatement A 2 R+, there are three possible outcomes.
The rst situation, the usual one, is characterized by partial abatement: "(Q) A > 0.
In this case, the rst order condition is given by P (Q)   C 0(Q)   v:"0(Q) = 0. If we set
(Q) = P (Q) C
0(Q)
"0(Q) , the optimal level of production Q = 
 1(v); that solves this condition
is simply a decreasing function of the marginal damage v. But this solution only occurs
if "(Q) A > 0; which requires that  1(v) > " 1(A) or that the xed level of abatement
good veries A < " ( 1(v)).
The second situation corresponds to full abatement of the emissions of the downstream
industry:. Q = " 1(A). This requires that the previous condition is not met i.e.,  1(v) 
" 1(A) or A  " ( 1(v)). But if we now bear in mind that this full abatement condition
means that max f"(Q)  A; 0g = 0, this production level is optimal as long as we do not
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reach the production level Qmaxwhich is e¢ cient when there is any damage. In other
words, this also requires that (P (Q)  C 0(Q))jQ=" 1(A)  0 or that A < " (Qmax).
Finally if A  " (Qmax), the optimal production level that solves program (1) will be
equal to Qmax. As we will see later, this last case never occurs, simply because pollution
is not taken into account. It is given here for the sake of completeness.
From all these observations, we can construct the social benet SB(A; v) of pollution
abatement. It is a piecewise continuous function depending on the xed level of abatement
A. However what really matters is the marginal social benet:. @SB(A;v)
@A
:
- if there is only partial reduction, this marginal benet will be, as usual, equal to the
marginal damage v;
- if there is full abatement with A > "(Qmax), additional abatement is fully ine¢ cient
since the optimal production level does not depend on A. The marginal social
benet is clearly 0;
- if there is full abatement with A 2 [" (Q(v)) ; "(Qmax)), the optimal production level is
positively correlated with A. The social marginal benet is then given by
P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))
"0(" 1(A))
= (" 1(A)) (2)
We know that this case occurs if  1(v)  " 1(A), which is equivalent to v >
(" 1(A)). In this last case the marginal social benet is therefore smaller than the
marginal damage.
More formally, we can state that:
Lemma 1. If (Q) = P (Q) C
0(Q)
"0(Q) ; inspection of program 1 shows that:
(i) The optimal production level is given by:
Q(v; A) =

max f 1(v); " 1(A)g if A < " (Qmax)
Qmax if A  " (Qmax) (3)
(ii) The marginal social benet is given by:
@SB(v; A)
@A
= max

min

v; (" 1(A))
	
; 0
	
(4)
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The social cost of abatement The social cost induced by the production of abate-
ment goods in quantity A is obtained, as usual, by choosing an optimal distribution of the
production between the di¤erent plants which comprise the eco-industry. But in our case,
this process involves not only the cost structure of these rms but also their pollution
structure. This cost is dened by:
SC(A) = min
a()0
R 1
0
 (a(i)) di+ v  R 1
0
(i)a(i)di (5)
subject to
R 1
0
a(i)di = A (6)
If we denote by  the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint, the rst order
conditions of this convex minimization problem are given by: 8i 2 [0; 1] , 0(a(i)) + v(i)    0 (with equality if ai > 0)
and
R 1
0
a(i)di = A
(7)
From these FOC we see that a given rm i is active if   v(i) > 0 and in this case its
production level is of (0) 1 (  v(i)). Since the emissions of these rms are increasing
with their index i, his also means that there exists a pivotal rm7 i0 =  1
 
min


v
; max
	
which is the rst for which it is optimal to stop the production. If we now keep bear in
mind that the total production level A of production of abatement goods is given, the
index of this rm can be obtained by making sure that the total level of production of
rms i  i0 is equal to A.
In other words, even if these rms share the same cost function, the optimal distribu-
tion of the global production is not symmetrical because they are heterogeneous in their
contribution to pollution. We can therefore expect that not all rms will be selected at the
optimal allocation. In order to dene this allocation, we also need some information about
the marginal social cost of the production of an additional unit of abatement goods. This
quantity is given by
@SC(v; A)
@A
. Since the constraint to the problem is
R 1
0
a(i)di = A,
the envelop theorem immediately tells us that the social marginal cost is equal to the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with this program.
More precisely, we can say:
Lemma 2. If A = 0 then a(i) = 0 for almost all i and (A) 2 ( 1; v:min] and for
A > 0 :
(i) The productions of abatement goods are given by:
a(i; A; v) =

(0) 1 ((A; v)  v:(i)) if i   1  
v

0 else
(8)
7As long as i0 is smaller than one. This is why we introduce the min


v ; max
	
in the denition of
this pivotal rm.
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(ii) (A; v) is implicitly dened by:R  1(minfv ;maxg);
0 (
0) 1 (  v:(i)) di = A (9)
(iii) The marginal social cost is given by:
@SC(v;A)
@A
= (A; v) (10)
As we have dened the marginal social cost and benet, it remains for us to nd the
optimal level of abatement.
4. Optimal outcome
With regard to our previous results, let us rst identify the optimal provision of abate-
ment goods. This level results from a trade-o¤ between the marginal social benet and
the marginal social cost. It is given by:
Aopt(v) = arg max
A0
SB(A; v)  SC(A; v) (11)
As expected, this program shows that the optimal production of abatement goods never
exceed " 1(Qmax), the level of abatement which maximizes the social benet without
damage. If the last case occurs, the social benet is constant while the costs are increasing
with the abatement e¤ort (see (ii) of Lemma 1), which contradicts optimality. We can also
observe that the optimal provision of abatement goods is always positive, i.e., Aopt(v) > 0.
Otherwise, the marginal cost of abatement is, by Lemma 2, smaller than v:min < v while
the marginal benet of an additional unit of abatement when there is no abatement at
all is of v since limA!0(" 1(A)) = +1 (see Lemma 1).
Following these observations, we can a¢ rm that the FOC associated with program
(11) is:
@SB(A; v)
@A
  @SC(A; v)
@A
= min

v; 
 
" 1(A)
	  (A; v) = 0 (12)
This condition clearly suggests that two kinds of e¢ cient outcomes occur, depending on
the level of the marginal damage. The rst situation is rather classical: the dirty rm
partially abates its emissions and the marginal damage of pollution is equal to both the
marginal benet and the marginal cost of abating pollution. The second case occurs if
the pollution of the dirty industry is totally removed but some pollution persists due to
the activity of the eco-industry. In this case, the marginal benet remains equal to the
marginal cost, but lower than the marginal damage induced by pollution.
Intuition suggests that the marginal damage v admits a threshold for which we switch
from one situation to the other. To get this intuition, let us start with a case in which
there is partial abatement in the dirty industry or, more formally from Equation (12), in
which  (" 1(A)) > v = (A; v). By equation (9), we can compute the optimal provision
Aopt(v) of the abatement good simply by replacing (A; v) by v. This quantity, given by:
Aopt(v) =
R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) di (13)
8
is obviously increasing with the marginal damage. But this case only holds seeing that
 (" 1(Aopt(v))) > v. So if on has in mind that  is a decreasing function, the left hand side
of the previous condition is decreasing in v while the right hand side in increasing. This
rather intuitive argument therefore suggests that the case of partial abatement disappears
for su¢ ciently high marginal damage levels.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique threshold v given by:
"
 
 1(v)
  R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) di = 0 (14)
with the property that if v < v there is only partial pollution reduction in the downstream
industry, while in the other case there is full abatement of the pollution emitted by the
dirty industry. The pollution of the eco-industry nevertheless remains in the last case.
If the marginal damage of pollution is lower than v, we are in the standard case de-
scribed by the literature. There is, at the optimal allocation, partial abatement of the
pollution emitted by the dirty industry. The only di¤erence is that there are now some ad-
ditional emissions due to the eco-industry. The aggregated level of abatement is a usually
chosen such that the marginal cost and benet are both equal to the marginal damage
of pollution and the aggregated level of production of the nal industry is commonly
decreasing with the marginal damage. In other words, there is a traditional arbitrage
between the reduction of the nal production and the increase in production abatement:
both quantities are negatively correlated when the marginal damage v changes.
However, the remaining emissions of the eco-industry contribute to a selection of which
rms in this sector should produce. This selection is not based solely on private cost-
minimizing considerations, but also takes into account the emissions of the eco-industry.
Since the aggregated marginal social cost is equal to the marginal damage, only the
rms which have a positive net contribution to pollution abatement (i.e., [1   (i) > 0]
produce, and because these rms are heterogeneous in their emissions, the less polluting
rms contribute more.
Moreover, since one unit of the abatement good removes one unit of pollution, we
observe that at the e¢ cient allocation, the marginal cost and benet from the aggregate
level of abatement are both equal to the marginal damage of pollution. Finally, we have
the usual arbitrage between the reduction of the nal production and the increase in
pollution abatement, which depends on the level of the marginal damage, since these
quantities are negatively correlated when v changes. More precisely, we can say that:
Proposition 1. If the marginal damage is not too high, i.e, v  v,only partial abatement
of the pollution of the dirty rm occurs, and e¢ cient allocation has the usual properties:
(i) the marginal benet and marginal cost of pollution abatement are both equal to the
marginal damage of pollution, i.e. @SB(A
opt;v)
@A
= @SC(A
opt;v)
@A
= v,
(ii) the optimal level of production Qopt =  1(v) is decreasing with the marginal damage
of pollution while the total production of abatement good
Aopt(v) =
R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) di (15)
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and the individual production are increasing with the level of the marginal damage.
(iii) all rms in the eco-industry that e¢ ciently reduce pollution, i.e, (i)  1,contribute to
the abatement but to di¤erent extents depending on their own emissions, i.e., 8i   1 (1),
aopt(i) = (0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) and this quantity is decreasing with (i),
The second case in which the marginal damage is higher than the threshold, v, is less
usual. Its interpretation largely depends on the assumption that the eco-industry pol-
lutes. In this situation, it becomes optimal to remove all the emissions of the upstream
industry, even if some pollution persists due to the activity of the eco-industry. As this
irreducible pollution is harmful, this may not be su¢ cient to improve the environment.
This is why it is also optimal (i) to reallocate the production of abatement goods to-
ward the less polluting rms in the eco-industry and (ii) to slow down the production of
abatement goods and therefore also the production of the nal good, since the emissions
from this activity are totally abated thanks to the eco-industry production. So it is not
really surprising that (i) the number of active rms decreases with the marginal damage,
contrary to the previous case in which all e¢ cient rms produce, and (ii) the level of nal
production is now positively correlated with the level of abatement, simply because the
maximal abatement level is reached and both are decreasing with the level of marginal
damage.
What is perhaps more surprising is that the marginal cost and benet from abatement
are now lower than the marginal damage of pollution. In order to understand this property,
let us start with a level of production in the eco-industry corresponding to the total
abatement, for which the marginal social benet of pollution reduction is equal to the
marginal damage. If the damage is high, this often requires a large reduction in the nal
output. So it is possible that the marginal social cost of producing enough abatement
goods to totally remove downstream emissions remains lower than the marginal damage
of the pollutants. This provides an incentive to produce more abatement goods and to
expand the production of the nal good in a way that ensures full upstream emission
abatement. More precisely, we observe that:
Proposition 2. If the marginal damage is high, i.e. v > v, the pollution of the dirty rm
is totally abated. The e¢ cient allocation has the following less usual properties:
(i) the marginal benet remains equal to the marginal cost of abatement, but this value is
now smaller than the marginal damage:
@SB(Aopt; v)
@A
=
@SC(Aopt; v)
@A
= opt(v) < v (16)
(ii) the optimal level of production Qopt = " 1(Aopt) bis now positively correlated with the
optimal level of abatement. The total production of abatement goods is now decreasing
with the marginal damage, since the pollution of the eco-industry can only be reduced by
reducing the production of these goods, i.e., dQ
opt(v)
dv
 0 and dAopt(v)
dv
 0:
(iii) some rms that can reduce pollution e¢ ciently are not active at the optimal allo-
cation. The rm i is active if (i) < 
opt0(v)
v
< 1.Moreover, the number of active rms
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decreases with the marginal damage: iopt(v) =  1

opt0(v)
v

veries di
opt(v)
dv
< 0: However,
their contribution to the production of abatement good aopt(i) = (0) 1 (opt(v)  v(i)),
remains decreasing with their emission rate.
(iv) the Lagrangian multiplier opt(v) 2 (vmin; v) is the unique solution to:
"
 
 1()

=
Z  1(v )
0
(0) 1 (  v:(i)) di (17)
It remains for us to analyze how to decentralize these two optimal equilibria.
5. The policy issues
We have shown that the model exhibits two kinds of e¢ cient allocation, depending
on the level of the marginal damage (v) and that these allocations have rather di¤erent
properties. In this section, we investigate whether a standard instrument like the Pigou-
vian tax can implement each of these equilibria in a competitive setting. This last point
will be veried in two steps. We rst assume that there is a price signal  representing
the emission tax and we compute the competitive allocation for each value of  . In the
second step, we determine the level of the Pigouvian tax that implements the e¢ cient
allocation in each case.
5.1. The competitive behaviors
We rst analyze the competitive behavior of the dirty rm, and then that of the
eco-industry rms. Lastly, we expose the abatement market equilibrium.
The dirty rm So let us start with the dirty rm. If there is a price signal
associated with the emission of pollution, this rm will choose its production supply and
its demand for the abatement good by solving the prot equation:
(Q;A) = max
Q0
8>>><>>>:p:Q  C(Q) minA0 fpa:A+ :max f"(Q)  A; 0gg| {z }
=CA(pa;;Q)
9>>>=>>>; (18)
We see that the objective function is linear in A on [0; "(Q)]. This implies that the
optimal conditional demand for abatement goods will be 0 if pa >  , "(Q) if pa <  , and
any quantity within [0; "(Q)] if pa =  . It follows that the abatement cost is given by
CA(pa; ; Q) = min fpa; g :"(Q) and that the FOC characterizing the product supply is:
p  C 0(Q) min fpa; g "0(Q)  0 (with equality if Q > 0) (19)
Since we know that the inverse demand is given by P (Q), the quantity which clears the
commodity market is obtained by:
Q(pa; ) = 
 1 (min fpa; g) (20)
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while the demand for abatement goods is:
Ad(pa; ) =
8<:
0 if pa > 
[0; " ( 1 ())] if pa = 
" ( 1 ()) if pa < 
(21)
The eco-industry rms Let us now study the supply of the abatement good. Each
rm i 2 [0; 1] in the eco-industry maximizes its prot:
i(a(i)) = max
a(i)0
fpa:a(i)  (a(i))  :(i):a(i)g (22)
the rst-order condition of which is given by:
pa   0(a(i))  :(i)  0 (with equality if a(i) > 0) (23)
So, if pa < min: , no abatement good is supplied while if pa  max;  each rm
produces and its production level is given by a(i) = (0) 1 (pa   :(i)). Finally if
pa 2 [min:; max:), only the rms with an index i   1
 
pa


produce. Hence, the
aggregated supply of abatement goods is:
As(pa; ) =
(
0 if pa

< minR  1(minf pa ;maxg)
0 (
0) 1 (pa   :(i)) di else
(24)
The abatement good market It now remains for us to study the equilibrium
of the abatement good market for any given price  of pollution. So let us denote by
z(pa; ) = A
d(pa; )   As(pa; ) the excess demand correspondence. A rst look at this
correspondence tells us that for any pa >  there is always an excess supply: when the
price of the abatement good is higher than  , nobody is willing to buy abatement goods
and therefore no equilibrium can be reached. We can now investigate whether pa =  and
min: < pa   can each be an equilibrium.
We begin by analyzing if pa =  clears the market. This requires that the upper bound
of the demand " ( 1 ()) at price  is higher than the supply at this price, i.e.:
"
 
 1 ()
  Z  1(1)
0
(0) 1 ( (1  (i))) di (25)
This conditions is similar to condition (14). This means that there exists a threshold
 = v, with the property that for all implicit pollution prices   v , pa =  is the market
clearing price of the abatement good market. With this observation we can a¢ rm that:
Lemma 4. If t  v, the equilibrium production levels of the aggregated market are given
by Qc() =  1 () and Ac() =
R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 ( (1  (i))) di. The equilibrium prices are
pc() = P ( 1 ()) and pca() =  . Moreover each e¢ cient rm in the eco-industry is
active and its production is given by ac(i; ) = (0) 1 ( (1  (i))).
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In the opposite case, i.e.  > v, the equilibrium price of the abatement good market is
lower than  but nevertheless higher than min: because there is no supply of abatement
at any price lower then min: (see equation (24) ). In fact this price solves:
"
 
 1 (pa)

=
Z  1( pa )
0
(0) 1 (pa   :(i)) di (26)
This also implies (i) that not all e¢ cient rms in terms of pollution reduction are active at
equilibrium since pa

< 1 and (ii) the pollution of the dirty downstream rm is completely
abated. More precisely, we can say:
Lemma 5. If  > v, the price of the abatement goods pca() is the unique solution to
equation (26) and is lower than the implicit price for emissions. The quantities traded on
the markets are given by:(
Qc() =  1 (pca()) = "
 1 (Ac())
Ac() =
R  1( pa(t) )
0 (
0) 1 (pa()  :(i)) di
(27)
The number of active rms in the eco-industry is given by ic() =  1

pca()


< 1 each of
them producing ac(i; ) = (0) 1 (pca()  :(i)). Finally the equilibrium of the commodity
market is pc() = P (Qc())
5.2. The level of the Pigouvian tax
In the previous section we analyzed competitive behaviors following the implementa-
tion of a Pigouvian tax. In this section we ask if there is a tax rate which implements the
e¢ cient allocation obtained either in Proposition 1 or Proposition 2.
If the level of the damage is such that it is optimal to partially abate the pollution of
the dirty downstream rm (v  v), we are back to the traditional case largely covered by
the literature: the Pigouvian tax has to be equal to the marginal damage. If  = v  v
the quantities traded at the competitive equilibrium (Qc(v), Ac(v) and ac(i; v) in Lemma
4) are exactly the same as the optimal quantities obtained in proposition 1. In this case
the price of the abatement good also reects the marginal damage since pca(v) = v.
If the marginal damage is higher than the threshold identied in Lemma 3 (v > v)
the value of  is less obvious. Assuming that the policy maker keeps the same rule (i.e.
 = v). Eq (26) tells us that the equilibrium price of the abatement good has to bebe
equated with the optimal Lagrangian multiplier representing the marginal social cost (see
Eq (17) in proposition 2). Hence, the quantities traded at the competitive equilibrium are
exactly the same as the e¢ cient quantities (see lemma 5). In other words, the policy rule
remains the same but the mechanism leading to the e¢ cient allocation is totally di¤erent.
By setting the Pigouvian tax at the level of the marginal damage, the adjustment of the
abatement good market results in a price corresponding to the social cost of abatement.
Hence, the ratio between this equilibrium price and the Pigouvian tax selects the number
of active rms in an optimal way.
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Proposition 3. As usual, the e¢ cient allocation is reached if the Pigouvian tax is set at
the level of the marginal damage. However, if the marginal damage is high (v > v) this
tax is higher than the marginal benet from abatement, which is given by the equilibrium
price of the abatement good.
6. Concluding remarks
In this article, we have investigated whether the hypothesis of a polluting eco-industry
challenges the usual results in economic literature. To this purpose, we considered a
vertical structure composed of a polluting downstream rm and an upstream eco-industry.
We assumed that eco-industry rms are heterogeneous and that they cannot reduce their
pollution level. Under these assumptions, we obtained two kinds of equilibrium. The
rst equilibrium, with a lower level of damage, extended the standard results of economic
literature to the case of a polluting eco-industry, but our results are very di¤erent when
the damage is high. In this case, the dirty rm must totally abate its emissions. To reduce
the remaining pollution, produced by the eco-industry, not all e¢ cient eco-industry rms
produce and the level of production among these rms is di¤erent to that of the rst
equilibrium. We found that the greater the damage, the lower the abatement level and
the smaller the number of producing eco-industry rms.
We nally show that both equilibria can be decentralized in a competitive economy
by means of a Pigouvian tax. Whatever the equilibrium, the regulator can follow a very
simple rule, because the Pigouvian tax should always be equal to the marginal damage.
However, this rule plays a di¤erent role in reaching each equilibrium.
Our results suggest that a polluting eco-industry is not a problem for the regulator,
because the competitive equilibrium selects the right rms to be in production, provided
that the regulator sets the correct level of the Pigouvian tax. However, this optimistic
conclusion depends on the crucial assumption of perfect information that we implicitly
make in our model. In the real world, the regulator cannot dene this tax so well, and our
results may not hold. Moreover, eco-industry is characterized by the fact that it is highly
concentrated. In this respect, one may wonder what level of the Pigouvian tax would
decentralize the optimum. Finally, this article takes as given the pollution features of each
rm. Taking into account the innovative process would make it possible to endogenize
the pollution distribution among rms. Further research is needed to investigate these
di¤erent questions.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Step 0: Some notations.
(i) Qmax = arg maxQ0
R Q
0
P (q)dq

  C(Q)

is given by P (Qmax)  C 0(Qmax) = 0. This quantity ex-
ists and is unique since (P (Q)  C 0(Q)) is, under our assumptions, a continuous and decreasing function
with the property that limQ!0 (P (Q)  C 0(Q)) = +1 and limQ!+1 (P (Q)  C 0(Q)) =limQ!+1 ( C 0(Q)) <
0
(ii) 8Q 2 [0; Qmax], (Q) := P (Q) C
0(Q)
"0(Q) is invertible and 
 1 : R+ ! [0; Qmax]. This follows, from the
fact that 8Q 2 [0; Qmax]
0(Q) =
(P 0(Q)  C 00(Q)) "0(Q)  "00(Q) (P (Q)  C 0(Q))
("0(Q))2
< 0 (28)
and limQ!0 (Q) = +1 and (Qmax) = 0.
Step 1: The existence of a solution Q(v;A) to program (1).
To prove this point, let us verify that we maximize (i) a strictly concave function on (ii) a domain
which can be reduced to the compact convex set [0; Qmax].
(i) Let us rst observe that
R Q
0
P (q)dq

  C(Q)

is a strictly concave function since its second deriva-
tive is given by (P 0(Q)  C"(Q)) < 0. Now, note that (" (Q) A) is convex in Q while v max fx; 0g is
convex and increasing in x (for v > 0), hence their combination v max f(" (Q) A) ; 0g is convex. We
therefore conclude that:
1(Q;A; v) =
  Z Q
0
P (q)dq
!
  C(Q)
!
  v max f(" (Q) A) ; 0g (29)
is strictly concave.
(ii) By (i) of step 0, and since vmax f(" (Q) A) ; 0g is non decreasing in Q, 1(Q;A; v) decreases after
Qmax. We can therefore reduce the maximization domain to [0; Qmax].
Step 2: The characterization of the solution Q(v;A):
Even if this problem is non-smooth but nevertheless concave, we can always dene the subdi¤erential
(see Rockafellar 1979 part V) of 1(Q;A; v) (see Eq (29)) with respect to Q. This quantity is given by:
@Q1 =
8<: P (Q)  C
0(Q) if Q < " 1(A)
P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))  v  "0  " 1(A) ; P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A)) if Q = " 1(A)
P (Q)  C 0(Q)  v  "0 (Q) if Q > " 1(A)
(30)
Since a maximum is reached if and only if 0 2 @Q1, this one is given by:
Q(v;A) =
8<:
Qmax if P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A)) < 0
" 1(A) if P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))  0 and P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))  v  "0  " 1(A)  0
 1(v) if P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))  v  "0  " 1(A) > 0
(31)
Now note that:
 P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A)) 7 0, " 1(A) ? Qmax (by (i) of step 0)
 P (" 1(A))  C 0(" 1(A))  v  "0  " 1(A) 7 0, " 1(A) ?  1(v) (by (ii) of step 0)
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Thus, we deduce that:
Q(v;A) =

Qmax if A > "(Qmax)
max

" 1(A);  1(v)
	
if A  "(Qmax) (32)
Step 3: The computation of @SB(A;v)@A :
If we replace Q by Q(v;A) in 1(Q;A; v) (see Eq (29)) and remember, by step 0, that 8v > 0,
 1(v) < Qmax, we obtain:
SB(A; v) =
8>>><>>>:
R  1(v)
0
P (q)dq

  C( 1(v))  v   "   1(v) A if A < "   1(v)R " 1(A)
0
P (q)dq

  C(" 1(A)) if A 2 "   1(v) ; "(Qmax)R Qmax
0
P (q)dq

  C(Qmax) if A > "(Qmax)
(33)
Moreover if we di¤erentiate this function piecewise with respect to A, we can see that:
@SB(A; v)
@A
=
8><>:
v if A < "
 
 1(v)

P(" 1(A)) C(" 1(A))
"0(" 1(A)) if A 2 ["
 
 1(v)

; "(Qmax)]
0 if A > "(Qmax)
(34)
is a continuous function (remember step 0) which can be summarized by @SB(A;v)@A = max

min

v; (" 1(A))
	
; 0
	
.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1: The solution to program (5).
Let us remember that the FOCs of program (5) are given by:
8i 2 [0; 1] , 0(a(i)) + v  (i)    0 ( = if ai > 0) (35a)R 1
0
a(i)di = A (35b)
It is a matter of fact to observe that if A = 0, almost all a(i) = 0, and Eq (35a) requires that   vmin
since 0(0) = 0 and (i) increasing. So let us us concentrate on the situations in which A > 0 and
 > v  min. From Eq (35a), we observe (i) that for  < v  max, only the rms i 2

0;  1
 

v

produce while, for   v  max, each rms is active, and (ii) that their individual production is given
by (0) 1 (  v  (i)). It remains to use Eq (35b) to get . This quantity is implicitly dened by:
2(;A; v) = A 
R  1(minfv ;maxg)
0 (
0) 1 (  v  (i)) di = 0 (36)
Let us now note that 8(A; v) 0, (i) lim!vmin 2 = A > 0, (ii) lim!+1 2 =  1 since lima!+1 0(a) =
+1 and (iii) this function is continuous and decreasing in  since:
@2 =  
R  1(minfv ;maxg)
0

"

(0) 1 (  v  (i))
 1
di < 0 (37)
for  6= v:max (remember that 0 (0) = 0). It therefore exists a unique (A; v) which solves Eq (36) for
each (A; v) and the optimal solution to program (5) is given by:
8i 2 [0; 1] , a(i; A; v) =

(0) 1 ((A; v)  v  (i)) if i   1  minv ; max	
0 else
(38)
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Step 2: The computation of @SC(A;v)@A .
@SC(A; v)
@A
=
R  1(minf(A;v)v ;maxg)
0 (
0 (a(i; A; v)) + v  (i)) @a
(i; A; v)
@A
di
+ ( (a(i; A; v)) + v  (i) a(i; A; v))j
i= 1((A;v)v )
 1v 
@(A; v)
@A
(if (A;v)v < max )
But for (A;v)v < max, i = 
 1

(A;v)
v

is the pivotal agent so that a(i; A; v) = 0 and since (0) = 0,
the second term vanishes. Moreover by Eq (35a):
@SC(A; v)
@A
= (v;A)
R  1(minf(A;v)v ;maxg)
0
@a(i; A; v)
@A
di
= (v;A) since
R  1(minf(A;v)v ;maxg)
0 a
(i; A; v)di = A
Step 3: Additional results for latter use.
Let us observe that for  < v  max we have:
 @2(;A;v)@ =  
R  1(v )
0

"

(0) 1 (  v  (i))
 1
di < 0 (remember that 0(0) = 0).
 @2(;A;v)@A = 1 > 0
 @2(;A;v)@v =
R  1(v )
0 (i)

"

(0) 1 (  v  (i))
 1
di > 0 (remember that 0(0) = 0).
It follows that:
@(v;A)
@v
=  @v2(;A; v)
@2(;A; v)
> 0 and
@(v;A)
@A
=   1
@2(;A; v)
> 0 (39)
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Step 1: There exists a unique threshold v
Let us verify that:
3(v) = "
 
 1(v)
  R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) di = 0 (40)
admits a unique solution v. This result is rather immediate since:
 3(v) is continuous and decreasing since:
03(v) =
"0
 
 1(v)

0 ( 1(v))
 
Z  1(1)
0
0@ (1  (i))
"

(0) 1 (v  (1  (i)))

1A di (41)
Moreover we know that (i), by assumption, "0(Q) > 0, (ii), by step 0 of the proof of lemma 1,
0(Q) < 0, and (iii), by the range of the integral, 1  (i)  0. Hence 03(v) < 0.
 limv!0 3(v) = " (Qmax) > 0. More precisely limv!0 3(v) = limv!0 "
 
 1(v)

since 0(0) = 0.
Using again step 0, we know that  1(0) = Qmax > 0. The result follows.
 limv!+1 3(v) < 0. By step 0 of the proof of lemma 1, we know that limQ!0 (Q) = +1. It
remains to remember that "(0) = 0 in order to conclude that :
lim
v!+13(v) =   limv!+1
R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (v  (1  (i))) di < 0 (42)
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Step 2: If v < v then the optimal abatement provision only partially reduces the emissions of the dirty
rm
By contraposition, assume that the e¢ cient solution requires full pollution abatement of the dirty
industry. At this optimal allocation opt and Aopt veries:
opt = 
 
" 1(Aopt
  v and Aopt   R  1optv 0 (0) 1  opt   v  (i) di| {z }
=2(opt;Aopt;v) (see Eq (36))
= 0 (43)
From the rst equation, we get that opt  v and Aopt  "   1(v). It follows, from step 3 of the proof
of lemma 2, that:
0 = 2(
opt; Aopt; v)  2(v; "
 
 1(v)

; v) = 3(v) (44)
Now remember by Step 2 that 3(v) = 0. Since 03(v) < 0, this implies that v  v.
Step 3: If v  v then the optimal abatement provision requires full pollution abatement of the dirty
industry
By contraposition, assume now that the e¢ cient solution requires partial abatement. At this
optimal allocation opt and Aopt veries:
opt = v < 
 
" 1(Aopt

and Aopt =
R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 ((1  (i)) v) di (45)
Since now Aopt < "
 
 1(v)

, we can say by using the second condition and step 3 of the proof of lemma
2 that:
0 = 2(v;A
opt; v) < 2(v; "
 
 1(v)

; v) = 3(v) (46)
Now remember by Step 2 that 3(v) = 0. Since 03(v) < 0, this implies that v < v.
D. Proof of proposition 1
Point (i): This result follows from the denition of the case.
Point (ii): By step 0 of the proof of lemma 1, we can say that dQ
opt
dv =
 
0
 
 1(v)
 1
< 0 and by
computation:
dAopt
dv
=
R  1(1)
0
(1  (i))
"

(0) 1 (v  (1  (i)))
di > 0 (47)
since 8i 2 0;  1(1) we have (1  (i)) > 0 and " > 0:
Point (iii): This follows from the proof of step 1 of lemma 2 for  = v
E. Proof of proposition 2
Point (i): This result follows from the denition of the case.
Point (ii): Since Qopt = " 1(Aopt) it is obvious that if dA
opt(v)
dv  0 then dQ
opt(v)
dv  0. So let us check
that dA
opt(v)
dv  0. To verify this point, let us remember that an optimal allocation is in this case dened
by:
2(
opt; Aopt; v) = 0 and opt = 
 
" 1
 
Aopt

(48)
By di¤erentiation, this implies that:0BBB@@2(;A; v)@| {z }
<0
 
0  " 1(A)
"0 (" 1(A))| {z }
<0
+
@2(;A; v)
@A| {z }
>0
1CCCA dA+ @2(;A; v)@v| {z }
>0
dv = 0 (49)
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and the result follows from the proof of Lemma 1 (step 0) and Lemma 2 (step 3).
Point (iii): Since opt(v) < v, the proof of the rst part of the result directly follows from equation (38).
It remains to verify that di
opt(v)
dv =
d 1

opt0(v)
v

dv < 0. Since (i) is increasing let us compute:
d ( (v;Aopt(v)) =v)
dv
=
1
v
0BBBB@
 
@ (v;A)
@A

A=Aopt(v)
 dA
opt(v)
dv
!
| {z }
<0
+
 
@ (v;A)
@v

A=Aopt(v)
   (v;A
opt(v))
v
!
| {z }
=W
1CCCCA
(50)
By point (ii) of this proof and Eq (39), we know that the rst term of the previous equation is negative.
Now let us note, by Eq (39), that the second term can be written as:
W =

 @2(;A; v)
@
 1
@2(;A; v)
@v
+

v
@2(;A; v)
@

(51)
If we now replace the derivatives of 2 by its value (see step 3 of the proof of Lemma 2), we obtain:
W =

 @2(;A; v)
@
 1
| {z }
>0
0BBB@R  1(v )0

(i)  
v

| {z }
<0

"

(0) 1 (  v  (i))
 1
| {z }
>0
di
1CCCA < 0 (52)
Point (iv): In this case, the marginal social benet is
@SB(v;A)
@A
= (" 1(Aopt(v))) = opt(v). It follows
that Aopt(v) = "
 
 1 (opt(v))

. But Aopt(v) =
R  1(v )
0 (
0) 1 (  v  (i)) di. We can therefore say
that opt(v) is implicitly dened by:
4() = "
 
 1()
  Z  1(v )
0
(0) 1 (  v  (i)) di = 0 (53)
and this equation admits a unique solution  2 (vmin; v) since:
 04() =
"0( 1())
0( 1())  
R  1(v )
0

"

(0) 1 (  v  (i))
 1
di < 0 (remember that 0 < 0, "0 > 0
and " > 0)
 lim!vmin 4() = "
 
 1(v:min)

> 0 because there is no production in the eco-industry (see
the proof of Lemma 2)
 lim!v 4() = "
 
 1(v)
  R  1(1)
0
(0) (v  (1  (i))) di < 0. In fact by Eq (46) we know that
0  2(v; "
 
 1(v)

; v)

=) [v  v] hence [v > v] =) 2(v; "   1(v) ; v) < 0. It remains for
us to observe that lim!v 4() = 2(v; "
 
 1(v)

; v).
F. Proof of Lemma 4
This result directly follows from our discussion.
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G. Proof of Lemma 5
We simply have to make sure that for all  > v, there exists a unique price pca() 2 [min:;  ] which
solves 5(pa; ) = "
 
 1 (pa)
 As(pa; ) = 0. To verify this point let us observe that:
(i) 8 > v, limpa!min:t 5(pa; ) = "
 
 1 (min  )

> 0 since As(min  ; ) = 0 (see Eq (24).
(ii) 8 > v, limpa! 5(pa; ) = "
 
 1 ()
   R  1(1)
0
(0) 1 (  (1  (i))) di < 0 by the denition of
this case.
(iii)8pa 2 (  min; ) , @pa5(pa; ) < 0 since:
@5(pa; )
@
=
"0
 
 1 (pa)

0 ( 1 (pa))
 
Z  1( pa )
0

"

(0) 1 (pa     (i))
 1
di (54)
(remember  (0) = 0), " > 0, "0 > 0 by assumptions and 0 < 0 by step 0 of the proof of Lemma 1.
H. Proof of Proposition 3
This result directly follows from our discussion.
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